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Circumvention by Delegation?
An Analysis of North Carolina's Open Meetings
Law and the Byrd Loophole
INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1976, six elected Student Bar Association repre-
sentatives at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of
Law requested permission to attend an official meeting of the law
school faculty.' Dean Robert Byrd summarily denied the students'
petition, declaring the meeting to be a closed "private faculty session. "2
Not to be deterred by an uncooperative administration, and apparently
eager to test their budding legal acumen, the students cited what they
claimed to be their statutorily protected right to attend any meeting of
a "public body" of a state institution pursuant to the North Carolina
Open Meetings Law and promptly filed suit against their own law
school.
3
One and a half years of litigation later, the students, who had -thus
far successfully petitioned for a permanent injunction to be entered
against Dean Byrd and the law school and defended a challenge at the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, saw their case holding reversed with-
out remand by the North Carolina Supreme Court.4 The law school's
surprise victory is especially notable due to the supreme court's nar-
row interpretation of North Carolina's seemingly broad Open Meetings
Law and the court's requirement that a subsidiary of a public body
need only constitute a "governing and governmental ' 5 entity in order
to fall within the law's purview. The fact that the law school ultimately
prevailed at the supreme court in Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd, even
though it had failed to file any sort of an answer or other responsive
pleading in the matter prior to the court's review, is also highly
intriguing.6
1. Parks H. Wilson, Jr., Recent Decisions, Sunshine Statute Requires that Law
School Faculty Meetings of a State University Be Open to Members of the General Public, 8
CUMB. L. REv. 539, 539 n.1 (1977).
2. Id.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to .7 (1978) (repealed 1979). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 143-318.9 to .18 (2007).
4. Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd (Byrd 1), 232 S.E.2d 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977);
Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd (Byrd II), 239 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 1977).
5. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 418.
6. Id. at 427.
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Justice Exum's dissent in Byrd argued that the majority's failure to
hold the faculty of a state-funded academic institution within the
ambit of the North Carolina Open Meetings Law created a legal "back-
door," whereby any state-sponsored agency or other governing body
could potentially circumvent the clear intent of the law.7 Although a
public body would normally be required to comport with the Open
Meetings statutes and allow the public to attend its meetings and
observe its deliberations and voting record, the precedent set by Byrd
allowed any delegated subsidiary parts of such bodies to operate as
though exempt from the law. This potentially meant that any discus-
sion, deliberations, or voting taking place at the subordinate level
would be effectively cordoned off from public view and scrutiny, thus
allowing public agencies to eviscerate the very purpose of the law.8
North Carolina's Open Meetings Law has been changed substan-
tially since the supreme court's 1977 decision in Byrd,9 and yet Byrd
still appears to remain good law in North Carolina.' ° In light of the
Byrd precedent and the various amendments to the law over the past
thirty years, this comment will address two concerns: first, whether
the North Carolina Supreme Court's logic in deciding Byrd was sound,
especially in view of the seemingly clear intent of North Carolina's
Open Meetings Law; and second, given the present-day version of
North Carolina's Open Meetings Law, whether state agencies and
other governmental bodies may still operate through the purported
Byrd loophole. Considered within the context of the relevant statutory
and case law of the time, the Byrd decision was tenuous at best-
decided without full consideration of the effect the holding would have
in creating a backdoor to the Open Meetings Law. This conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that the modern version of the law has wisely
abrogated the Byrd loophole, which will likely result in the overturning
of the decision should a direct challenge ever come before a North Car-
olina court.
I. NORTH CAROLINA'S OPEN MEETINGS LAW (1977 AND 2007)
A. General Principles
In 1977, Article 33B of the North Carolina General Statutes con-
cisely explained the public policy rationale for having an "open meet-
7. Id. at 428.
8. Id.
9. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to .7 (1978) (repealed 1979), with N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.9 to .18 (2007).
10. See infra note 86.
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ings" law: "Whereas . . .bodies which administer the legislative and
executive functions of this State and its political subdivisions exist
solely to conduct the peoples' business, it is the public policy of this
State that the hearings, deliberations and actions of said bodies be
conducted openly."" Recognizing a "deeply entrenched sense of enti-
tlement on the part of the state's citizens," the North Carolina General
Assembly adopted a series of statutes in 1971 that sought to ensure
that all governmental organizations and their respective subdivisions
were held publicly accountable at all times, with certain circumstances
excepted.12 No official legislative history exists. 13 Nonetheless, five
central themes of importance can be determined in analyzing Article
33B: (1) what is considered a "governing and governmental body of
the State"; (2) enumerated, specific statutory exceptions to the open-
ness requirements; (3) allowances for a body subject to the law to hold
a "closed session"; (4) what (if any) public notice requirements
existed; and (5) what remedies were available to the complaining citi-
zenry that proved a governmental body was in violation of the law.1 4
A brief statutory analysis of the 2007 version of North Carolina's
Open Meetings Law, and particularly the amendments since Byrd, will
prove an instructive precursor to an examination of the Byrd decision
and its contemporary implications.
B. Applicability of the Open Meetings Law
North Carolina's Open Meetings Law originally applied to all offi-
cial meetings of "governing and governmental bodies of this State and
its political subdivisions ... which have or claim authority to conduct
hearings, deliberate or act as bodies politic."'1 5 This definition, though
deemed "very broad coverage" by legal scholars shortly after its incep-
tion, 16 was construed so narrowly in practice that the legislature
repealed the original law in 1979."7 The law was reconstituted with a
more robust (and twice as long) scope, making it applicable to
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 (1978) (repealed 1979).
12. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Open Government Guide NC,
http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/item.php?t=short&state=NC&level=F1 (last visited Feb. 25,
2009).
13. Id.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to .7 (1978) (repealed 1979).
15. Id. § 143-318.1.
16. David M. Lawrence, Interpreting North Carolina's Open-Meetings Law, 54 N.C.
L. REv. 777, 781 (1975). An interpreting court could determine an agency to be
subject to the law in three different ways: the conducting of hearings, deliberations, or
any other action as a "body politic."
17. See Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd (Byrd II), 239 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 1977).
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any elected or appointed authority, board, commission, committee,
council, or other body of the State... [including specifically] constitu-
ent institutions of The University of North Carolina, or other political
subdivisions ... that (i) is composed of two or more members and (ii)
exercises or is authorized to exercise a legislative, policy-making,
quasi-judicial, administrative, or advisory function.' 8
The first piece of the new two-part definition is reflective of the federal
version of the law, known as the Government in the Sunshine Act,
which also uses the "two or more ... members" language and is inclu-
sive of agencies where a majority of the individual members are
appointed by the President with senatorial advice and consent.1 9 It is
apparent that the North Carolina General Assembly intended, pursu-
ant to the amended version of the law, for a court or other interpreting
body to err on the side of openness and inclusivity in determining
which bodies are subject to the law's reach. An analogous intent is
reflected to some extent by the Supreme Court of New Mexico's deci-
sion in Raton Public Service Co. v. Hobbes:
[Wihether governing bodies of local subdivisions are reasonably
included within the term "all governing bodies of the state[ I" . . .
[poses] no difficulty in concluding that they may be, if we consider
that "governing bodies of the state" means "governing bodies within
the state," rather than "state governing bodies." Government bodies of
local governmental subdivisions within the state are governing bodies
of the state in the broadest sense.2 °
This "within the state"-"state governing" dichotomy, interpreted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in the opposite direction, would prove
pivotal in the Byrd decision.2 1
The meaning of "official meeting" has remained fundamentally
unchanged since the North Carolina law's 1971 inception, clearly per-
taining to a "meeting, assembly, or gathering together ... for the pur-
pose of conducting hearings, participating in deliberations or voting
upon or otherwise transacting the public business. 2 2 The only signifi-
cant change in the 2007 version of the law was the inclusion of lan-
guage pertaining to telephonic and electronic forms of "meetings. 2 3
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10 (2007).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (2007).
20. Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 417 P.2d 32, 36 (N.M. 1966).
21. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1978) (repealed 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.10(d) (2007).
23. The increased frequency of electronic meetings, and how to allow the public to
attend and observe such occurrences, necessitated the passage of additional open-
meetings statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.13 (2007).
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On its face, the primary purpose of this statute appears to be the facili-
tation of public accountability for a body politic's voting record. It is
important to recognize, however, that the legislature intends its inclu-
sion of the word "deliberations" to ensure that the public is informed
not only of how votes are cast, but also as to the rationale underlying
such votes, and to "educate the public concerning the factual basis of
and the issues involved in any public question. "24
C. Exceptions
Certain governmental bodies have been explicitly excluded from
the purview of the Open Meetings Law. Some of these bodies were
excepted under both the 1977 and modern-day versions of the law,
including the General Court of Justice, grand and petit juries, and the
Judicial Standards Commission. 5 Others have seen their exception
status revoked by subsequent amendments. For example, the 1977
law excepted "all State agencies ... exercising quasi-judicial functions
during any meeting or session held solely for the purpose of making a
decision in an adjudicatory action or proceeding. '26 As noted above,
however, the current version of the law's definition of "public body"
includes the "quasi-judicial" phrasing,2 7 which denotes a narrowing in
statutory thinking on this issue: the exception under 2007 law extends
only to "quasi-judicial" activity by a "public body subject to the State
Budget Act" when holding an adjudicatory meeting.2 Agencies per-
forming actions relating to the hiring, investigation, or firing of state
employees are also exempted, presumably due to a combination of pri-
vacy concerns for the employee at issue and the necessity of secrecy for
effective investigative proceedings to occur at the agency level.29
One other substantial change between the 1977 and 2007 laws is
the removal of language which provided that "[any committee or sub-
committee of the General Assembly has the inherent right to hold an
executive [closed] session when it determines that it is absolutely neces-
sary . . . to prevent personal embarrassment or when it is in the best
interest of the State" to do so. 30 Generally, modern American courts
have followed the lead of landmark federal cases, such as Chevron
24. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 784.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4 (1978) (repealed 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.18 (2007).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(8) (1978) (repealed 1979)
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10(b) (2007).
28. Id. § 143-318.18(7).
29. Id. § 143-318.11(a)(6).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(10) (1978) (repealed 1979) (emphasis added).
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , with regard to
the judicial presumption of substantial deference to agency determina-
tions in their respective areas of expertise (but such deference is only
appropriate where the authorizing statute is "specific" and "unambigu-
ous" in its empowerment of the agency to make such judgment calls,
the standard announced in Chevron).3 2 The expectation of the North
Carolina legislature that any and all governmental bodies should
retain the power to determine, of their own accord, what is in the "best
interest of the State" and when they may choose to except themselves
from the law to avoid their own potential embarrassment was both
overly general and ostensibly unreasonable, and therefore patently in
conflict with the Chevron precedent. The removal of this provision
from the modern version of the law is thus unsurprising.
D. Closed Sessions
While the ideal of public accountability is a noble one, even the
most publicly accountable governmental bodies need to call for non-
public, closed-or, "executive"-sessions from time to time. Cognizant
of these needs, the North Carolina legislature has maintained a series
of scenario-specific exceptions to the Open Meetings Law that are fun-
damentally different from the blanket exemptions provided to particu-
lar agencies and bodies in the "Exceptions" provisions noted above.
Included in this category of specific exceptions are matters dealing
with any records that can be construed as privileged and confidential
and matters that fall under any category of legally protected privilege
(such as attorney-client or doctor-patient).33
In many instances, a public body is required by statute to have an
attorney present at its official meetings, while under other circum-
stances a body may choose when and if it will retain the services of an
attorney. In such cases, the statute circumvents the otherwise appar-
31. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
32. Id. at 842-43 ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3 (1978) (repealed 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.11 (2007).
540 [Vol. 31:535
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ent ethical conflict an advising attorney would face between keeping
his client's information confidential and maintaining openness on the
public record so as to comply with the Open Meetings Law. In a simi-
lar vein, a body may go into a closed session while it considers the
potential hiring, firing, or investigation of a state employee, as well as
times during which a body needs to assume actions of negotiation and
strategy with regard to public services, the alienation of publicly
owned real property and other assets, and the like.34 The only notable
change from the 1977 law to the 2007 version is the altered language
of the last section, which in the 1977 version allowed for closed ses-
sions when necessary to deal with "riot[s] or [imminent] public disor-
ders."'35 Presently, the statute creates specific exceptions for school
board planning sessions relating to "incidents of school violence" and
other government bodies' "plans to protect public safety as it relates to
existing or potential terrorist activity. "36
Perhaps the most significant change to the closed-session
allowances statute was procedural in nature. The 1977 law included
no language stipulating how a government body needed to go about
calling for a closed session; presumably, the decision to enter into a
closed session was entirely at the discretion of the body's members. In
outright contradiction to the Open Meetings Law's purposes of open-
ness and accountability, the number of "secret" meetings that regularly
occurred under the law's original version is unknown, since there was
no requirement for keeping a formal record of "executive" proceedings.
This apparent omission was corrected over the next thirty years in
a number of amendments. The 2007 version of the law mandates that
a body politic "may hold a closed session only upon a motion duly
made and adopted at an open meeting. '37 The body must cite, on the
record, the "permissible purposes" for which the closed session is
being called, and, where applicable, the particular law making the
information to be discussed privileged and confidential. 38 In the event
the public body is seeking legal advice on a lawsuit, it must first name
the pertinent parties to the action at an open meeting.39 Here again
exists evidence of the North Carolina legislature amending its Open
Meetings Law in favor of increased accountability with more rigid pro-
cedural requirements and mandatory public disclosure in situations
34. See supra note 33.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(c) (1978) (repealed 1979).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.11(a)(8)-(9) (2007).
37. Id. § 143-318.11(c).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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where an agency seeks to temporarily exempt itself from otherwise
requisite public openness.4 °
E. Notice Requirements
Although requiring the provision of adequate notice to the public
seems endemic to any open meetings statute-the physical presence of
the public being an essential prerequisite to keeping the public
informed-the original version of the North Carolina Open Meetings
Law plainly failed to include any such stipulation.4 1 While the law
explicitly prohibited "closed meetings," its failure to include a notice
requirement appeared to allow for "secret meetings" to occur; a meet-
ing could be called at an irregular time or place, and while the public
would not be formally excluded, such an act would essentially equate
to an "executive session. '42 It was not until 1976 that the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals finally announced the implied existence of a
notice requirement in its decision in News & Observer Publishing Co. v.
Interim Board of Education.43 Holding as insufficient the notice pro-
vided to a newspaper's corporate office only one hour prior to the
commencement of a special meeting of the Interim Board of Education
regarding the selection of a new board member, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals determined that the Open Meetings Law "would be
meaningless unless the public had notice of meetings of the bodies
covered by it."'4 4 The court first enunciated a "reasonable notice" stan-
dard for governmental bodies subject to the law, and then proceeded to
narrow its own definition, declaring that "one-hour notice given by
telephone ... [is] insufficient, [but] 48 hours' notice for all meetings is
unreasonably long."45
The North Carolina legislature eventually codified a notice
requirement in 1979.46 The statute expands upon the News &
Observer Publishing Co. holding, requiring "at least 48 hours notice"
by bulletin board posting at the meeting's location, as well as by tele-
phone or mail to any person who has filed to receive such notice for
40. For a further discussion of suggested legislative restraints upon an agency's
exemption procedures from open meetings laws, see Joseph W. Little & Thomas
Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C. L. REV. 452 (1974).
41. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 786.
42. Id.
43. 223 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
44. Id. at 588.
45. Id. (referring to the forty-eight hour notice requirement established in Chapter
153A of the North Carolina General Statutes, which covers regular and special
meetings of boards of county commissioners). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-40 (1976).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.12 (2007).
542 [Vol. 31:535
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any non-emergency meeting that is held at an irregular time or place.47
Emergency meetings, which are only those "called because of generally
unexpected circumstances that require immediate consideration,"
require public notice to be "given immediately" after the notification of
the board's own members.4" Where public meetings are held at regu-
larly scheduled times and locations, it is compulsory for the public
body to keep a copy of its meeting schedule with the Secretary of State
(for state-level agencies) or an equivalent official at the county and
local levels.49
F. Remedies for Non-Compliance
The 1977 version of North Carolina's Open Meetings Law
included one brief section authorizing citizens to bring complaints
against non-compliant government bodies, giving "[a]ny citizen denied
access to a meeting" the "right to compel compliance . . . [through the
seeking of a] restraining order, injunction[,] or other appropriate
relief."5° Notably, the legislature did not provide for any judicial nulli-
fication of actions already taken by a board violating the law. Scholars
at the time argued that the withholding of such a remedial tool from a
reviewing court's power would do little to curb the actual effects of an
agency in breach of the law, even if an individual official could be
severely fined or even temporarily incarcerated. 5 ' It was not until
1985 that the remedial provisions of the law were more extensively
fleshed out, thanks in part to lobbying efforts by the North Carolina
Press Association to add a "voidability remedy" to the statutes.
5 2
The Open Meetings Law now contains three separate sections
dealing with remedies: (1) injunctive relief (probably the most com-
monly issued corrective measure); 53 (2) declaratory judgments render-
ing particular decisions or actions null and void (and abrogating any
need for a plaintiff to show special damages different from the public
47. Id. § 143-318.12(b).
48. Id. § 143-318.12(b)(3).
49. Id. § 143-318.12(a).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.6 (1978) (repealed 1979).
51. Little & Tompkins, supra note 40, at 479 ("But merely enjoining or even jailing
public officials who violate the law does not correct the harm that may already be
done by decisions taken in secret. Consequently, courts should be given authority to
invalidate tainted actions upon petition of citizens. Invalidation should be
discretionary, however, within the constraints of what is in the best interest of the
public at the time the court makes its ruling.").
52. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 12.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.16 (2007); Lawrence, supra note 16, at 816-17.
2009]
9
Fleder: Circumvention by Delegation? An Analysis of North Carolina's Open
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
at large, a deviation from the usual tort standard);54 and (3) the assess-
ment and award of attorneys' fees at a court's discretion (including the
possible assessment of such fees against one or more of a board's indi-
vidual members).55 It has been argued, however, that the proclivity of
reviewing courts to simply enjoin the public body from any further
non-compliance with the requirements of the Open Meetings Law may
have an ultimately detrimental effect on the statutory rights of an
agency to hold a closed session when necessary and as allowed by the
law's exceptions and exemptions:
A board under a flat injunction not to violate the statute is likely to be
very careful in any gray area of the statute, preferring to meet in public
rather than run the risk of being held in contempt. As a result, some of
the policy considerations recognized by the inclusion of the exceptions
in the statute might be vitiated. More appropriate injunctive relief
would be to forbid the specific conduct that led to the lawsuit.56
With the preceeding framework established and the significant
distinctions between the 1977 and 2007 versions of the North Carolina
Open Meetings Law identified, an informed exploration of the Student
Bar Ass'n v. Byrd5 7 decision, rationale, and consequent ramifications
can now be undertaken.
II. THE. BYRD PRECEDENT AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECT
A. The North Carolina Court of Appeals Holding
The North Carolina Court of Appeals opinion in Byrd is not a
garrulous one. The court first commented that the defendants in the
case had lost at the trial level on essentially procedural grounds-at no
time prior to the court's ruling did counsel for the defendants file an
answer to the initial complaint or assert any other exception to the trial
court's preliminary findings of fact.58 Citing Rule 8 of the North Caro-
lina Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reminded the defendants that
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.16A (2007). It should be noted that lawsuits
seeking such declaratory relief are required to be filed within forty-five days "following
the initial disclosure of the action that the suit seeks to have declared null and void."
Id. § 143-318.16A(b). The "initial disclosure" standard is potentially ambiguous;
while the statute states that where the challenged action is contained in the board's
formal minutes, the action is deemed disclosed on the "date the minutes are first
available for public inspection," and the statute leaves it to a court's discretion to
determine the date of "initial disclosure" for any challenged non-recorded action. Id.
55. Id. § 143-318.16B.
56. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 817 (footnote omitted).
57. Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd (Byrd 1), 232 S.E.2d 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
58. Id. at 856.
544 [Vol. 31:535
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"[alverments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required,
other than those as to the amount of damages, are [deemed] admitted
when not denied," and as the defendants had not entered any such
pleading, the facts as presented by the plaintiffs were deemed truthful
as alleged.5 9 With no factual issues in controversy, the court then pro-
ceeded to address the two basic legal issues presented: whether North
Carolina's Open Meetings Law as it existed in 1977 should be gener-
ally construed in a broad or narrow fashion; and consequently,
whether the law school faculty at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill fell within the scope of the Open Meetings Law at that
time.6 °
The court began its concluding paragraphs by stating,
The act we consider is broad in its scope. . . . The General Assem-
bly... attempted to draft... [section] 143-318.2 [of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes] in such terms that it would cover (with a few
specific exceptions) every meeting where the business of the people may
be conducted. We note the broad language of that section and com-
pare it with the narrow list of agencies exempted from the act by [sec-
tion] 143-318.4.6
The court of appeals, like the trial court below it, understood that
North Carolina's Open Meetings Law was intended by the state legisla-
ture to be construed expansively, with an interpreting court expected
to express a preference towards the application of the law to more, and
not fewer, governmental agencies, state bodies politic, and their
respective delegations and subcommittee counterparts. 62
The court then turned to the question of whether or not the law
school faculty was subject to the law in the context of this broad inter-
63Todcdpretation. To decide this issue, the court first addressed the organic
statute establishing the University of North Carolina.64 Pursuant to
Article 1 of Chapter 116, the state legislature delegated "'the general
determination, control, supervision, management and governance' of
59. Id.
60. Id. at 856-57.
61. Id. at 858.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 857.
64. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116-1 to -44.9 (1975); see also Boney Publishers,
Inc. v. Burlington City Council, 566 S.E.2d 701, 704 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("[Tlhe
courts must refer primarily to the language of the enactment itself. A statute that 'is
free from ambiguity, explicit in terms and plain of meaning' must be enforced as written,
without resort to judicial construction." (quoting Clark v. Sanger Clinic, P.A., 542
S.E.2d 668, 671-72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001))).
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all of the affairs ... of the University" to a Board of Governors.65 The
Board of Governors, in turn, "is given the authority to delegate any
part of its authority over the affairs of any institution to the Board of
Trustees of a constituent institution or, through the President of the
University, to the Chancellors of the institutions. ' 66 A Chancellor
functions as the "administrative head of the institution and exercises
complete executive authority therein and is subject to the direction of
the President . . . [and] is responsible for carrying out policies of the
Board of Governors and Board of Trustees... [and keeping them] fully
informed concerning the operation of the institution. "67
In light of the statutory language, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals determined that "[w]hether the Board [of Governors] has dele-
gated any of its governing powers in a particular instance, is a ques-
tion of fact. Defendants, by their failure to answer . . . the complaint
appear[ ] to admit that the Law School Faculty does, in fact, govern the
Law School."' 68 The court listed at length the various functions per-
formed by the defendant-faculty that supported its conclusion, includ-
ing the faculty's retention of final decision-making control over the size
of each enrolling class, changes to the curriculum, and rules relating to
re-admissions, none of which were ever subject to review or ratification
by any higher University of North Carolina authority (which might
otherwise relegate the faculty to an advisory, as opposed to governing,
body in the eyes of the court).69 These facts, combined with the ascer-
tained legislative intent of the Open Meetings Law, led the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals to conclude that the law school faculty was
"delegated the authority not only to deliberate on but to conduct the
'people's business' related to the operation of their tax supported Law
School," thus putting the defendants squarely within the ambit of the
law and requiring them to admit any and all members of the public to
any official meeting held by the faculty.7" Further, the court stated,
The General Assembly has established the policy that the people's
business shall be conducted in public. That policy would be frustrated
if the public is admitted only at the highest decision-making level and
is excluded at the level where the real deliberation, debate and deci-
sion-making process takes place before a subordinate body.71
65. Byrd 1, 232 S.E.2d at 857 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-11(2)).
66. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-11(13)).
67. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-34).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 857-58.
70. Id. at 858-59.
71. Id. at 859.
546 [Vol. 31:535
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals' apparent concern was the crea-
tion of a legal "loophole" through which a public body might circum-
vent the Open Meetings Law by delegating its power to make sensitive
decisions to its own subsidiary component. 2 It was this particular
portion of the appellate court's decision that would provoke the ire of
the North Carolina Supreme Court nine months later, leading to the
reversal of the lower courts and, it would seem, the judicial allowance
of these loopholes.
B. The North Carolina Supreme Court's Reversal- a Loophole Created
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the opinion below,
ostensibly basing its decision on the same legal issues considered by
the court of appeals. The court first addressed the question of whether
the Open Meetings Law was intended by the General Assembly to be
interpreted as a broad or narrow set of statutes.73 Then, in light of the
decision rendered on the first question, the court addressed the funda-
mental dispute -whether the law school faculty fell within the purview
of the law.74
72. Id.
73. Student Bar Ass'n. v. Byrd (Byrd II), 239 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1977).
74. Any analysis of the North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Byrd II would be
incomplete without some mention of two lesser issues referenced by the court in the
majority holding: the question of notice, and the potential exempting issue raised by
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)
(2007).
Although the question of implied notice under the Open Meetings Law was
seemingly settled in News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim Board of Education, 223
S.E.2d 580, 588-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976), where the court of appeals formulated a
"reasonable notice" requirement more than a year before the supreme court decided
Byrd II, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Byrd II made no reference whatsoever to the News & Observer precedent. See
Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d 415. The North Carolina Supreme Court asserted in Byrd II that
the Open Meetings Law "contains no provision requiring any body to give to the
public notice of any meeting," and the court presumed that the six-hour prior notice
requirement applied under the trial court's injunction was "derive[d] from a similar
requirement in an order entered by the Chancery Court of Tennessee on March 31,
1976 in" Fain v. Faculty of the College of Law of the University of Tennessee, 552 S.W.2d
752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 418. The North Carolina Supreme
Court rejected the trial court's six-hour prior notice requirement, stating that "there is
no comparable provision in the Open Meetings Law of this State." Id.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (the FERPA) withheld
federal funds from allocation to any "educational agency or institution which has a
policy or practice of permitting the release of educational records . . . or personally
identifiable information contained therein other than directory information." 20
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1). Because the University of North Carolina institutions, as state
2009]
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The North Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation regarding
which political bodies were subject to the 1977 Open Meetings Law
represented a fundamental about-face from the manner in which the
same statutory text was construed by the court of appeals below. In
determining the meaning of the terms "governing and governmental"
and "body politic," the majority purported to discern an entirely differ-
ent legislative intent. The court gave great weight to the General
Assembly's use of grammar, noting that "[t]he statute uses the term
'governing' and the term 'governmental' in the conjunctive, not the dis-
junctive relation, '75 which was taken to mean that the terms were not
synonymous, and that a governmental agency essentially had to meet
two different definitions in order to be held subject to the law.76 In a
similarly narrow construction of the definition of "body politic," the
court required that for an agency to be subject to the Open Meetings
Law, it had to "exercis[e] powers which pertain exclusively to [a] gov-
ernment, as distinguished from those possessed also by a private indi-
vidual or... association. '77 As the court summarized, the language of
this statute "is designed to be restrictive, rather than broadening, and
shows an intent of the legislature to limit the Open Meetings Law to
meetings of 'governing and governmental bodies' strictly construed. 78
Thus, the supreme court forged a clear deviation from the court of
appeals' notions of the law's "broad language, 79 opting instead for a
much narrower holding that "[tihe only meetings required by [section]
143-318.2 [of the North Carolina General Statutes] to be open to the
public are [the] official meetings" of a restricted category of political
bodies.8 °
schools, were entitled to and did receive significant monies through various federal
programs, the defendants in Byrd II argued that if law faculty meetings were required
to be open to the public, the school would inherently violate the FERPA, resulting in a
major financial crisis. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 419. Although the court held that the
issue was not "determinative of the present appeal," it did remark,
[TIhe possibility that all further Federal financial aid to the entire University
of North Carolina, including all its component institutions, may be
jeopardized by an interpretation of the Open Meetings Law making it
applicable to meetings of the faculty of the School of Law is an additional
reason for care in so construing the Open Meetings Law.
Id.
75. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 420-21.
76. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
77. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 420-21.
78. Id.
79. Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd (Byrd 1), 232 S.E.2d 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
80. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 419 (emphasis added). The dissent in Byrd II echoed the
North Carolina Court of Appeals' broad interpretation of the Open Meetings Law as
[Vol. 31:535548
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The majority was argumentative in justifying its asserted position
on the second question-whether a law school faculty of a state univer-
sity was indeed subject to the Open Meetings Law-from the outset of
its analysis. Before ever reaching the merits of either party's argument,
the court proclaimed that "the statute affords no basis for distinction
between the faculty of the School of Law, the faculty of the English
Department, the Athletic Department or the football coaching staff,"
and went on to suggest that it would "create substantial consternation
... if a rival school's coach. appeared and demanded admission to a
conference of the University's football coaching staff called to consider
strategy."81 How could the appellate judiciary possibly hold that the
state law school's faculty meeting constituted "the people's business" if
it meant opening up the university football team's playbooks to any
politically savvy rival institution?82 The court apparently took such
concerns very seriously, noting in its concluding sentence its "fail[ure]
to find" any exempting language in the exceptions section of the law
that would provide "any ground for the denial of such a demand. 8 3
well. Id. at 424 (Exum, J., dissenting) ("The spirit of this law is that a democracy
works best when the electorate knows how it is working. This kind of law should be
liberally, not stintingly, construed. . . . Exceptions to this law, on the other hand,
should be narrowly construed.").
81. Id. at 418 (majority opinion).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 (1978) (repealed 1979). In responding to these
seeming public policy assertions, the dissent cited at length from a speech delivered by
the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill on campus during University Day Exercises only two months prior to the Byrd II
decision:
The University belongs . . . to all of the people of North Carolina ....
... [W]e owe it to that public not only to acknowledge their ownership
but to include them in our governance, to inform them, to genuinely seek
their support, to be respectful of their views, to explain our own and to be as
solicitous of their understanding as we are of their tax dollars.
Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 424-25 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting Tom Lambeth, Speech at
University Day Exercises, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Oct. 12, 1977)).
83. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 419 (majority opinion). Apparently seeking further
validation for its football-minded concerns, the court reminded the parties, with no
supporting precedent cited, that "a court may legitimately consider consequences to
be anticipated from the respective possible constructions of a statute in determining
which of these the Legislature most probably had in mind when it enacted the statute."
Id. at 418.
The dissent, however, argued that it had managed to find the exempting language
overlooked by the majority in section 143-318.3(b) of the North Carolina General
Statutes:
[Section] 143-318.3(b) provides: "Nor shall this Article be construed to
prevent any board of education or governing body of any public educational
2009] 549
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Notwithstanding its athletic apprehensions, the majority did
reach the legal issue in controversy, and pursuant to its statutory anal-
ysis of the Open Meetings Law, announced a two-part test, both prongs
of which had to be met for a "component part" of a state body to fall
within the jurisdiction of the Open Meetings Law. 4 The court held
that the body must "(1) be a component part of a 'governing and gov-
ernmental' body of the State ... and (2) the [component part in ques-
tion] must 'have or claim authority to conduct hearings, deliberate or
act' as a 'body politic.'"85 As the entire text of the test was taken
directly from the relevant statute of the Open Meetings Law of the
816time, it appeared that the only analytic aspect of the test left to the
courts would be the particular definitions of the terms used in the test
and how they were applied to the facts at bar.8 7
institution, or any committee or officer thereof, from hearing, considering
and deciding disciplinary cases involving students in closed session." Why
insert this limitation unless such bodies were otherwise covered by the Law's
general operative provisions?
Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 426 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.3(b) (1978) (repealed 1979)).
84. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 419 (majority opinion).
85. Id.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 (1978) (repealed 1979). One of the substantial
changes to the Open Meetings Law between 1977 and 2007 is that the present-day
statute now specifically defines terms like "public body," and does so both at greater
length and in far broader terms than did its 1977 predecessor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.10 (2007) ("As used in this Article, 'public body' means any elected or appointed
authority, board, commission, committee, council, or other body of the State, or of one
or more counties, cities, school administrative units, constituent institutions of The
University of North Carolina, or other political subdivisions or public corporations in
the State that (i) is composed of two or more members and (ii) exercises or is
authorized to exercise a legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative, or
advisory function. In addition, 'public body' means the governing board of a 'public
hospital' as defined in [section] 159-39 and the governing board of any nonprofit
corporation to which a hospital facility has been sold or conveyed pursuant to
[section] 131E-8, any subsidiary of such nonprofit corporation, and any nonprofit
corporation owning the corporation to which the hospital facility has been sold or
conveyed.").
87. Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 426-27 (Exum, J., dissenting) (recalling the defendants'
utter failure to submit a responsive pleading or in any other way contest the facts as
alleged by the plaintiffs and determined by the trial court, the Byrd II dissent believed
that any such "analysis" was entirely misplaced: "Whether the law school faculty is a
subsidiary or component part of the Board of Governors and whether it is 'a body
politic' are essentially questions of fact. The majority mistakenly treats them as
questions of law answered by reference only to its own notions of what the faculty is
and its relationship to the Board of Governors.").
550
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss3/5
CIRCUMVENTION BY DELEGATION?
The court seemed to have difficulty in arriving at a clear decision
as to whether the law school faculty of the University of North Caro-
lina could be considered a "component part" of a state body, pursuant
to the first prong of the test.88 In the sentence prior to announcing the
test, the court stated, "Obviously, the faculty of the School of Law is a
'component part' of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
This alone does not bring its meetings within the scope of the [law]
.... ,89 The court initially discussed the delegated-power hierarchy of
the University of North Carolina system, wherein the court found that
the General Assembly had in fact vested the Board of Governors of the
University of North Carolina with "the general determination, control,
supervision, management and governance of all the affairs of all of the
... constituent institutions of the University."90 Thereafter, the court
decided that being a "component part" of a state institution was not
analogous to being a "component part" of the governing body of a
state institution, and thus the "faculty ... is not a 'subsidiary or com-
ponent part' of the Board of Governors, but is simply a group of
employees of the Board."91
The court's analysis of the test's second prong turned on the cho-
sen definitions of the test's key phrases. After several paragraphs' con-
sideration of various scholarly definitions, the court narrowly defined
the term "body politic" as "a body acting as a government; i.e., exercis-
ing powers which pertain exclusively to a government."92 The phrase
"governmental body" was defined as having "at least some of the pow-
ers of government ... [and] the attributes of sovereignty. They are not
possessed by individuals and private associations, as a matter of natu-
ral right .... -" These were deemed to include "the power to tax, to
appropriate public money, to adjudicate controversies, to maintain a
police force," and related matters. 94 The Byrd majority was thus able
to exclude the law school faculty from the Open Meetings Law vis-A-vis
the University's supervising body:
88. See id. at 418-19 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 419.
90. Id. at 421 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 419-20. The dissent disputed the majority's finding that neither the law
school faculty nor the Board of Governors fit the definition of "body politic," pointing
to section 116-3 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which "expressly designates
the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina to be and continue 'as a
body politic and corporate.'" Id. at 426 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 116-3 (1975)).
93. Id. at 421 (majority opinion).
94. Id.
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The Board of Governors ... operates the educational institutions
comprising the University and has the power to do all acts incidental
thereto, but so does the "governing body" of a privately endowed and
operated university. The Board of Governors of the University of
North Carolina has no governmental powers; i.e., no powers peculiar
to the sovereign.
95
The court's definition of the term "governing" was the most cen-
tral to its ultimate determination that the plaintiff-law students had
failed to sufficiently establish that the law school faculty satisfied the
two-prong test, which would have subjected it to the Open Meetings
Law. The court held the phrase to include only those political bodies
that
ha[ve] the ultimate power to determine [their] policies and control
[their] activities. Such body may delegate .. .authority to make, ini-
tially, such decisions, but such employee or group of employees is not
the "governing body" so long as his or its determinations are subject to
review and reversal by the higher authority, by whose permission such
determination is made.96
Thus the Byrd loophole was created. The court's intention in so
holding was understandable and rational. Executive power is accom-
panied by responsibility for the acts executed, and those who are
vested with such power have the duty to review, parse, amend, and
approve (and to be ultimately accountable for) any and all work prod-
uct of their subordinate components. Thus, the law would not under-
stand one of these subsidiary parts as fulfilling a standard description
of a "governing" body. In so holding, however, the majority failed to
heed its own authority, as stated earlier in its opinion-"a court may
legitimately consider consequences to be anticipated from the respec-
tive possible constructions of a statute.
97
The statute at issue in Byrd was the Open Meetings Law-a law
with an explicit purpose of opening up to public accountability both
the actions taken by a political body at its official meetings and also
why those actions were taken. In essence, by excluding the official
meetings of "components" of otherwise publicly accountable bodies
through its two-prong test, the Byrd majority allowed bodies subject to
the Open Meetings Law to delegate their more sensitive and questiona-
ble functions to subordinate bodies, thereby removing any discussion
or deliberation of such actions from the public purview. So delegated,
these subcommittees and component parts at worst could then handle
95. Id. at 422 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-11).
96. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 418.
552 [Vol. 31:535
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any unpleasantries, potential embarrassments, or plain illegalities
outside the boundaries of public scrutiny; determine a course of action
most advantageous to the delegating body (which may or may not be
in the best interests of the general public); and recommend the course
of action up to the official "governing body," which could then sign
such proposals into acting policy without the burden of public com-
mentary and potential discord.98 As Justice Exum warned in his dis-
sent to Byrd:
[Olne purpose of the [Open Meetings Law] was to prevent at non-pub-
lic meetings the crystallization of secret decisions to a point just short
of ceremonial acceptance. Rarely could there be any purpose to a non-
public pre-meeting conference except to conduct some part of the deci-
sional process behind closed doors. The statute should be construed
so as to frustrate all evasive devices. 99
The dissent's concerns notwithstanding, the Byrd majority
reversed the trial court and the court of appeals, applying its two-
prong test and determining that the law school faculty at a state-spon-
sored university was not a "body politic," not a "governmental" or "gov-
erning" body, and thus was not subject to the North Carolina Open
Meetings Law.' 00 In so doing, the Byrd loophole was created.
98. Id. at 428 (Exum, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (quoting Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974)).
100. The majority cited to little precedent from other state courts' decisions,
explaining that "[aill of the Open Meetings Laws of the several states ... vary widely in
their terms, and so decisions from the courts of those states establishing their scope
are of meagre assistance in construing the North Carolina Act." Id. at 422 (majority
opinion). The court did find some support in McLarty v. Board of Regents of the
University of Georgia, 200 S.E.2d 117 (1973), where the Georgia "Sunshine Law" was
held inapplicable to the meetings of a teacher-student committee that formulated
student-fund allocation recommendations at the behest of the Dean of Student Affairs
of the University of Georgia, and "[did] not encompass the innumerable groups which
are organized and meet for the purpose of collecting information, making
recommendations, and rendering advice but which have no authority to make
governmental decisions and act for the State," id. at 119. See Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at
422-23.
In seeking other states' decisional support for its rebuttal, the Byrd II dissent
looked primarily to Cathcart v. Andersen, 530 P.2d 313 (Wash. 1975) (en banc), which
saw the Supreme Court of Washington hold its Open Public Meetings Act applicable to
meetings of the law school faculty at the University of Washington, where the court
determined that the "purpose of the Act is to allow the public to view the decision-
making process at all stages," id. at 316. See Byrd II, 239 S.E.2d at 429 (Exum, J.,
dissenting).
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III. BYRD ABROGATED? PRESENT-DAY OPEN MEETINGS LAW
Could a North Carolina political body within the purview of the
2007 version of the Open Meetings Law successfully circumvent the
law by delegating certain of its powers and responsibilities to a subdi-
vision or component part? The state supreme court's opinion in Byrd
remains an unchallenged precedent and has been cited by federal and
state courts both in and outside of North Carolina.1 °1 In terms of how
North Carolina's Open Meetings Law is to be generally construed by
in-state courts, the 2007 version of the "Public Policy" section of the
law implies that the General Assembly has reasserted its intent that the
statute be broadly, as opposed to narrowly, interpreted. The inclusion
of all "public bodies that administer the legislative, policy-making,
quasi-judicial, administrative, and advisory functions" is certainly
more encompassing than the "governing and governmental" language
that was so heavily stressed by the Byrd majority. 10 2 However, the
argument could be made (and indeed, it was-by both the trial court
and the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Byrd) that the 1977 Open
Meetings Law was similarly intended to be broadly construed; yet the
Byrd loophole still resulted. Are there any measures incorporated into
the present-day version of North Carolina law that function to close
these Byrd loopholes? The answer is unambiguously in the
affirmative.
By defining in the statutory text each of the key terms used in the
2007 Open Meetings Law, the legislature sought to preclude future
courts from following Byrd and claiming any authority to construct
their own definitional determinations in interpreting the Open Meet-
ings Law. The broad definition of "public body" requires only that it
be comprised of "two or more members" who are exercising (or are
authorized to exercise) "legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial,
administrative, or advisory function[s]. '' 10 3 Such bodies are consid-
ered to comprise not only the obvious elected and appointed authori-
ties, but all other "board[s], commission[s], committee[s], council[s],
or other bod[ies] of the State."1°4 "Official meeting" is inclusive of
nearly any "meeting, assembly, or gathering together . . .for the pur-
pose of conducting hearings, participating in deliberations, or voting
101. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 917 F.2d
812, 817 (4th Cir. 1990); Polk County Bd. of Supervisors v. Polk Commonwealth
Charter Comm'n, 522 N.W.2d 783, 796 (Iowa 1994).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (2007).
103. Id. § 143-318.10(b).
104. Id.
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upon or otherwise transacting the public business, '"105 which presuma-
bly includes any of the "pre-meeting conferences" referred to by the
Byrd dissent. 
10 6
Further, even when closed sessions may be held by a public body
via the enumerated exceptions under the law, a "general account" of
the body's goings-on in closed session must be recorded and main-
tained so that any future allegations of non-compliance may be subject
to thorough investigation.10 7 Thus, although it technically remains
unchallenged judicial precedent in North Carolina, the loophole cre-
ated by the majority decision in Byrd has been sufficiently closed by
the last three decades of effort by the North Carolina General Assem-
bly. Nonetheless, history dictates that there will always be those who
seek to circumvent publicly beneficial laws that promote relatively
unfettered accountability, and only a watchful public and a mindful
judiciary can ensure that North Carolina's Open Meetings Law will
continue to serve its purposes in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
It certainly appears that the University of North Carolina law stu-
dents in Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd would have a greatly improved
chance at jurisprudential success under the modern version of North
Carolina's Open Meetings Law. Nonetheless, as the North Carolina
Supreme Court's opinion in Byrd awaits a facial challenge within the
state, it would behoove the wary practitioner who files an Open Meet-
ings Law-based complaint in the state to consider both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Byrd to ensure the thoroughness of a legal
argument. For complaints regarding public authorities that clearly fall
within the "body politic" and "governing and governmental" defini-
tions embraced by the supreme court in Byrd, such an exercise should
be relatively straightforward, but for those public bodies that exist in
the gray area between the narrow two-prong test asserted in Byrd and
those broader definitions reiterated in the current statutes, a degree of
caution is appropriate. The proper legal definition of an adversarial
public body within one's legal pleadings is inherent to a successful
Open Meetings Law claim in North Carolina, and although the Byrd
loophole has by all intents and purposes been occluded by statute, its
105. Id. § 143-318.10(d).
106. Student Bar Ass'n v. Byrd (Byrd II), 239 S.E.2d 415, 428 (N.C. 1977) (Exum,J.,
dissenting).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.10(e), -318.11 (2007).
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unchallenged existence may still bring some of its curious legal reason-
ing to bear in present-day challenges.
Samuel David Fleder
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